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FRANCIS RUSSELL HART 



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FRANCIS RUSSELL HART 



Reprinted from The Journal of American History, 

Volume II, Number II- — Copyright 

assigned to the Author 



Associate -PttbUsljrrfl uf Amrrtrau JRwor&fl 

NEW HAVEN, CONNECTKM T 



Aimiral l^rnim 



'HE somewhat uncertain 
'^ i peace brought about in 
j| Europe in 1736, largely 
■ L through the efforts of Sir 
• Robert Walpole, served 
to strengthen the family 
compact between the 
Bourbon courts of France and Spain 
and to give time for the increase of 
the naval forces of these countries 
rather than to encourage, as Walpole 
had hoped, a continued tranquility. 

The great sea power of England 
had made possible the development of 
a large English trade with Spanish 
America during the alliance of Eng- 
land and Spain in the war against 
France. This growing commercial 
supremacy of England was naturally 
unwelcome to Spain, and both by en- 
forcing the limitations placed upon 
trading, inserted in the Treaty of 
Utrecht, and by annoying restrictions 
in the Spanish ports of America, 
Philip endeavored to reduce to almost 
a disappearing point English inter- 
course with the Spanish colonies. 

English trading vessels, always at 
that time partially armed, were hav- 
ing frequent encounters with Spanish 
vessels, and on neither side were the 
agreed upon stipulations duly respect- 
ed. Walpole, more prudent than the 
adventurous traders of England be- 
lieved consistent with the honor of his 
country, vainly tried to hold down the 
clamorers for war in Parliament. The 
final event which made the efforts of 
Walpole wholly powerless for peace 
was the seizure off the Spanish Main 
by the ship "Isabel," of an English 
merchant ship loaded with contraband 
stuffs, under Captain Jenkins. The 
commander of the "Isabel" appears to 
have treated Captain Jenkins with un- 
usual cruelty, and, before releasing ^ 
him, cut off one of his ears. In the 
spring of 1739, Jenkins appeared, 
amid great excitement, at the Bar of 
the House of Commons, displaying 
his mangled ear and telling the story 
of his misfortunes. The pressure was 
too great, Walpole had to give way, 
and on June 13, 1739, war was de- 
clared against Spain. 1 



Among the members of Parliament, 
in the opposition, violently opposed to 
the ministry, and equally violently 
urging a war of reprisal against 
Spain, was Captain Edward Vernon, a 
naval officer, who urged that an imme- 
diate expedition be sent out against 
Porto Bello, and vigorously asserted 
that the place would not only be cap- 
tured, but pledged himself to take it 
with six ships only. In order to more 
clearly appreciate the bearing of the 
influence of Vernon upon the events 
of this time, and more particularly 
upon the expedition associated with 
his name, it is necessary to glance at 
the record of his previous career. He 
appears to have had an amount of in- 
fluence in the House of Commons 
and a popular favor outside, which 
made it impossible for the minister 
to whom he was violently opposed to 
ignore either the plans he proposed or 
his own offer to command the expe- 
dition. 

Edward Vernon was the second son 
of James Vernon, Secretary of State 
to William III. and was born in West- 
minster the twelfth of November, 
1684. After a thorough study of the 
classics and the mathematical sciences, 
he was allowed by his family to yield 
to a natural taste for the sea, and en- 
tered the navy in 1 701. He was with 
Admiral Hopson in the "Torbay" at 
Vigo, the twelfth of October, 1702, and 
was second lieutenant on the "Resolu- 
tion" in the expedition against 
Hispaniola, commanded by Captain 
Walker. Afterwards he served with 
distinction with Admiral Sir George 
Rook and with Sir Cloudesley Shovel. 
His first command as captain was of 
the "Jersey," in which he was sent to 
Port Royal, Jamaica, and for three 
years had a successful career on the 
West Indian station, capturing many 
prizes. This was followed by many 
years of more important commands, 
chiefly in the Battle, interspersed with 
intervals of serving in the House of 
Commons. It was the belief in Eng- 
land that if Porto Bello and Cartagena 
were taken, that Spanish power in 



Admiral B^rnott 




the New World would be irredeem- 
ably broken, and shortly after the 
declaration of war Vernon was given 
a commission as vice-admiral of the 
Blue, and placed in command of a 
squadron of ships of war to be sent to 
the West Indies. His instructions 
were "to destroy the Spanish settle- 
"ments in the West Indies and to dis- 
"tress their shipping by any method 
"whatever." 

The squadron consisted of the 
"Burford" of 70 guns and 500 men, 
"Lenox" of 70 guns and 480 men, 
"Elizabeth" of 70 guns and 480 men, 
"Kent" of 70 guns and 480 men, 
"Worcester" of 60 guns and 400 men, 
"Strafford" of 60 guns and 400 men, 
"Princess Louisa" of 60 guns and 
420 men, "Norwich" of 50 guns and 
300 men, and "Pearl" of 40 guns and 
240 men, in all nine ships carrying a 
total of 550 guns and 3,700 men. 

Admiral Vernon sailed from Ports- 
mouth the twenty-third of July, 1739, 
and after some delays and digressions, 
occasioned chiefly by an unsuccessful 
search for a squadron of the enemy 



near the Spanish coast, arrived at Port 
Royal, Jamaica, the twelfth of Octo- 
ber. With this as a base the Admiral 
proposed to attack Porto Bello and 
Cartagena, with such of his squadron 
as he had remaining, several vessels 
having been detached for special ser- 
vice in harassing the Spanish mer- 
chantmen. The ships remaining were 
the "Burford," "Princess Louisa." 
"Worcester," "Strafford," and "Nor- 
wich," and to these the Admiral was 
able to add at Port Royal the "Hamp- 
ton Court" of 70 guns and 495 men, 
and "Sheerness" of 20 guns and 300 
men, together with 200 marines ob- 
tained from Governor Trelawney. 

On the fifth of November, this 
squadron set sail, the "Sheerness" be- 
ing sent as a scout in the direction oi 
Cartagena, while the rest headed for 
Porto Bello. off which porl they lay 
to on the twentieth of thai month. 
On the twenty-first, he attacked the 
Iron Fort, so called, al the harbor's 
entrance, with his full strength at 
close range, and with such vigor that, 
after a short but spirited resistance, 



Admiral Hrrnnn 



it surrendered. The next morning, 
while instructions were being given to 
govern the attack upon the remaining 
fortresses of San Jeronimo and Gloria 
Castle, a boat with a flag of truce 
came to the admiral's ship, the result 
of which was a speedy capitulation on 
terms dictated by Admiral Vernon. 2 

As a result of this capitulation the 
English fleet secured two Spanish 
men-of-war of 20 guns each, one 
other vessel, 40 brass cannons, 4 brass 
mortars, 18 smaller brass guns, a 
quantity of ammunition and about ten 
thousand dollars. The fortifications 
and some 80 iron cannons were ren- 
dered useless before the departure of 
the squadron, which shortly returned 
to Jamaica. 

As had been predicted^ Porto Bello 
was taken with six ships, and when 
the news, which had been despatched 
to London, reached there, the thanks 
of both Houses of Parliament were 
voted to the admiral. 

The English reports of this victory 
state the number of men taken to 
have been five officers and thirty-five 
men "out of three hundred, the rest 
"being either killed or wounded or 
"having made their escape ;" the Span- 
ish accounts, however, declare that 
Porto Bello was defended by a total 
of thirty men and five cannons, and 
Spanish historians point with amuse- 
ment to the celebration of this victory 
in London. The actual record of the 
numbers of cannons taken away, how- 
ever, and other circumstances, make 
it appear improbable that the popular 
Spanish version is strictly correct, 
although it is equally probable that 
the English account exaggerates the 
strength of the Spanish garrison. 
The official report of the governor of 
Panama to the king of Spain is in- 
definite as to the number of troops 
employed, but corroborates in the 
main Vernon's own account, and re- 
fers in complimentary terms to the 
courtesy and moderation of the Eng- 
lish admiral. 

On the twenty-fifth of February, 
1740, Admiral Vernon, after refitting 



his ships, sailed again from Jamaica 
for the Spanish Main, and from the 
sixth to ninth of March bombarded 
Cartagena, doing some damage, but 
also receiving enough injuries to his 
smaller craft to make it expedient to 
sail to Porto Bello to effect repairs. 
On the twenty-second of March, he 
attacked Chagres, laying off that place 
and keeping up a moderate but con- 
tinual bombardment until, on the 
twenty-fourth, the garrison capitu- 
lated. 3 The ships engaged in the 
■bombardment were the "Strafford," 
"Norwich," "Falmouth" and "Prin- 
cess Louisa." After seizing a consid- 
erable quantity of goods of value from 
the Custom-house stores and taking 
on board all serviceable brass cannons 
and other grins, the Custom-house was 
destroyed by fire, and on the thirtieth 
the squadron sailed again for Jamaica. 
That the strength of the Cartagena 
fortifications was fully realized is 
clear from the fact that before again 
assaulting that place, Admiral Vernon 
remained almost constantly for 
months at Jamaica, re-enforcing his 
squadron with ships and men. Late 
in the year his squadron was joined 
by a number of store ships under con- 
voy, and by transport ships with 
troops. In January, 1741, he was 
further re-enforced by a squadron un- 
der Rear-Admiral Sir Chaloner Ogle, 
consisting of thirty ships of the line 
and some ninety other vessels, the 
ships being manned by fifteen thou- 
sand sailors. The land troops sent 
out from England amounted to about 
12,000, these latter being augmented 
at Jamaica by 3,600 troops from 
the American colonies.* 



*These American troops were made up 
as follows: from Massachusetts, five com- 
panies; Rhode Island, two companies; Con- 
necticut, two companies: New York, five 
companies; New Jersey, three companies; 
Pennsylvania, eight companies; Maryland, 
three companies; Virginia, four compa- 
nies; North Carolina, four companies. 
Among other American officers was Colo- 
nel Lawrence Washington, and it was on 
account of his association with Admiral 
Vernon that Mount Vernon subsequently 
received its name. 



Admiral Burnett 




SENTRY BOX ON WALL OVERLOOKING THE SEA AT CARTAGENA 



The command of all the land troops 
had been given to Major-General 
Lord Cathart, who unfortunately died 
before reaching Jamaica, and the com- 
mand fell upon Brigadier-General 
Thomas Wentworth,' who appears to 
have been particularly unsuited for 
the great responsibility thrust upon 
him. 

The causes which led to the later 
practical failure of this expedition 
against Cartagena cannot be attribu- 
ted to the lack of proper preparations 
or equipments, nor to the haste em- 
ployed ; indeed, the expedition appears 
to have been planned with the most 
careful regard to all details. Vessels 
were engaged in scout service to de- 
termine as clearly as possible the 
whereabouts of the French squadron 
under Admiral the Marquis d'Antin, 
and careful observations had con- 
stantly been made of the fortifications 
about Cartagena, the prevalent 
weather conditions, currents, etc., as 
well as the depths of water off the 
town and at the Boca Chica forts. 
The instructions given to the fleel on 
sailing from Jamaica divided the 



fighting vessels into three divisions, 
one under Vice-Admiral Vernon 
(commander-in-chief), one under 
Rear-Admiral Sir Chaloner Ogle, and 
one under Commodore Lestock, and 
comprised some thirty line-of-battle 
ships, twenty-two frigates and a large 
miscellaneous squadron of transports, 
fire-ships, bomb-ketches and tenders. 
In all there were one hundred 
twenty- four sail. 1 Not unnaturally 
the rumors of these preparations 
for the attack mi Cartagena readied 
that place weeks before the news 
became a certainty, through the 
definite reports of a French ship 
which appears to have been sent to 
Cartagena by the French admiral ex- 
pressly to warn the inhabitants ^\ the 
impending attack. 

During the last week in January, 
1741, the three divisions sailed from 
Port Royal, a few days apart, effect- 
ing a junction at sea on the thirty- 
first, and making Cape Tiberon, on 
the Western extremity of Hispaniola 
i ni iw tin- I -land of 1 laili and San 
Domingo) on the seventh of February. 
Vfter several clays of careful recon- 



A&mtral Bentnn 



noitering to make certain whether or 
not the French fleet had sailed for 
Europe as reported, the three divi- 
sions came to anchor in the bays near 
the cape. On the twenty-fifth of 
February, the fleet left for Cartagena 
under easy sail, and came to anchor 
on the fourth of March a few leagues 
to windward (i. e., to the eastward) 
of the town of Cartagena, between 
that place and Punta Canoas. Dur- 
ing several days, detailed preparations 
for the attack were made, and various 
councils of war held, one of which 
settled the important matters relative 
to the distribution of the expected 
booty 5 and one confirming the admir- 
al's plan of attack. Great care seems 
to have been taken to obtain as com- 
plete plans as possible of the forts at 
Boca Chica, and careful soundings 
were made by some of the smaller 
vessels all along the Tierra Bomba 
shore and at the entrance to the har- 
bor. A feint at landing on the shore 
side of the town was made by some 
of the smaller vessels, apparently for 
the purpose, and probably to some ex- 
tent successful, of engaging the 
attention of the enemy from the real 
landing point at Boca Chica." 

On the morning of the ninth, Sir 
Chaloner Ogle, with his division, 
moved forward to the attack, followed 
by Admiral Vernon with his division 
and all the transports, leaving the 
division under Commander Lestock 
at anchor. As the ships moving to 
leeward approached Boca Chica, the 
small fort of Chamba (on Tierra 
Bomba, east of Boca Chica Castle) 
fired a few shots, but was soon 
silenced and deserted. Three of the 
8o-gun ships were anchored close to 
the Forts of San Jago and San Felipe 
and maintained a very hot fire, so that 
these forts were soon deserted, and 
the evening of that day grenadiers 
were landed and took possession of 
them without meeting any resistance. 
Also during the evening, from the 
bomb-ketches and from those of the 
ships which could comfortably ap- 
proach, a continual fire was kept up 



against Boca Chica Castle, which was 
returned with some spirit, under cover 
of which firing troops and artillery 
were landed during the night and next 
forenoon. The troops were en- 
camped under the protection of a 
woody growth near, but apparently 
somewhat protected from Boca Chica 
Castle. It was during and immedi- 
ately after the landing of these troops 
that the serious differences of opinion 
between General Wentworth and Ad- 
miral Vernon began to arise, differ- 
ences which afterwards were to prove 
to a large extent the cause of the fail- 
ure of the expedition, and which 
served at once to create a most unfor- 
tunate feeling of antagonism between 
the sea and land forces. The admiral 
complained of the delays of the troops 
to press the attack upon the castle, 
and on the eleventh he and Sir Chal- 
oner Ogle joined in a letter to Gen- 
eral Wentworth, urging immediate 
action. That delays somewhat diffi- 
cult to understand did take place is 
evident from the fact that on the 
nineteenth, owing to complaints from 
General Wentworth, several vessels 
undertook successfully, but with some 
difficulty, to silence the Baradera Bat- 
tery on the opposite side of the har- 
bor entrance, the fire from which 
reached the encampment of the troops, 
and on the twenty-first of March, at 
a council of w)ar of the naval com- 
manders, complaint as to the slow 
progress of the troops was formally 
made. 7 Finally, on the days from 
the twenty-fourth to twenty-sixth, 
by the joint co-operation of the 
vessels and troops, both Boca Chica 
Castle and that of San Jose were 
taken, as also was one of the Spanish 
ships. San Jose appears to have been 
almost deserted when taken, and it is 
probable that this fort was not actively 
defended. That the defence of Boca 
Chica Castle itself was gallant and 
spirited is certain from the clear rec- 
ord of the extensive operations against 
it. Before being taken, however, the 
defenders had largely made their es- 
cape, and had found time to par- 



Aftmtrai Berttntt 




VIEW OF CITY OF CARTAGENA FROM TOP OF THE OLD FORTRESS OF SAN LAZARO 

(From a photograph taken 1S92) 



tially block the channel up the bay by 
sinking the Spanish ships "Africa" 
and "San Carlos/' besides burning the 
ship "San Felipe" on the shore. 

During the next few days, the fleet 
was able to enter the bay, the batteries 
at the small Passo Caballos entrance 
were easily destroyed and a safe an- 
chorage established. The forts at 
Boca Chica were adequately garri- 
soned, the troops re-embarked, and 
preparations were made for the real 
attack upon the city. 

The Spanish viceroy, Lieutenant- 
General D. Sebastian de Eslaba, 
was resident at Cartagena, together 
with the military governor of the 
city, D. Bias de Leso. According 
to contemporary Spanish accounts, 
the forces at the disposal of the vice- 
roy and governor were eleven hun- 
dred veteran soldiers, three hundred 
militia, six hundred Indians, and two 



companies of negroes and free mu- 
lattoes. The naval forces in the har- 
bor were six ships with six hundred 
seamen and four hundred soldiers, 
making about four thousand men in 
all. These are probably accurate es- 
timates of the actual Spanish forces, 
and it is certain that the strength of 
the defense of the place was due to 
its well-built fortifications rather than 
to the number of its defenders, whose 
numbers were undoubtedly much 
fewer than the attacking forces. The 
viceroy had ample notice of the com- 
ing of the attacking expedition and 
concentrated his small forces at im- 
portant points on the walls of the city 
itself and at San Lazaro, a strong for- 
tress, built "ii a slight elevation, out- 
side the walls, and guarding the ap- 
proach to the city from the land side. 
ddie strategic importance of this for 
tress and a veneral idea of the walls. 






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ISH MAP OF CARTAGENA, IN 1735 



r J , C aranot)ct Cjc* 



Admiral lernntt 



and other fortifications of Cartagena 
can best be obtained by a glance at 
the map. 

It was considered essential by the 
attacking forces to first occupy San 
Lazaro, and indeed, if this had been 
accomplished, it is probable that the 
remaining Spanish troops would have 
been insufficient to have made any 
long effective resistance to an en- 
trance into the city. At a council of 
war held on board the "Princess Car- 
oline," March 30, in Cartagena Har- 
bor, in which the division command- 
ers of both the sea and land forces 
took part, it was resolved to land the 
troops at a convenient point on the 
south side of the harbor, under pro- 
tection of the guns of the ships, the 
first duty of the troops to be to cut off 
all land communications from the 
city. s On the first few days of April, 
troops were landed at Isla de Gracias 
close to Mansanilla Castle, from which 
a fairly good road reached into the 
town passing under the walls of San 
Lazaro. This landing was made 
without opposition, the guns from the 
ships sweeping the country between 
Isla de Gracias and San Lazaro, and 
the landing-place being beyond the 
range of the guns at Castillo Grande ; 
the relative positions of these places 
and others referred to in this account 
are clearly indicated on the maps. 

With the landing of the troops the 
dissensions between the commanders 
of the land and sea forces began 
anew ; Admirals Vernon and Ogle 
appear to have constantly condemned 
the procrastination of General Went- 
worth and urged the necessity for im- 
mediate action if serious ravages of 
sickness among the troops were to be 
avoided, and General Wentworth as 
constantly urged the necessity for 
more efficient co-operation on the part 
of the fleet, asserting that the ships 
should be brought into the inner har- 
bor, where the town itself and, more 
particularly, San Lazaro, would be 
within effective ransre of fire. The 



experiment of sending one of the cap- 
tured ships into the inner harbor was 
tried by Admiral Vernon, but the ship, 
although apparently finding sufficient 
water, was finally of necessity aban- 
doned, as, unsupported, it could not 
stand the close fire from the city walls. 
This incident, which furnished one of 
the prime causes of dispute among 
the respective partisans of Admiral 
Vernon and General Wentworth both 
then and later in England, is easily 
understood by those familiar with the 
harbor of Cartagena. The water in 
the inner harbor is now, and undoubt- 
edly was then, too shallow to hold 
ships of the size of Vernon's fighting 
vessels, but owing to a very narrow 
and winding channel it is quite possi- 
ble that one or two ships might, with 
careful piloting, enter the inner har- 
bor. 

The friends of General Wentworth, 
in charging Admiral Vernon with 
neglect in this instance, were clearly 
in the wrong, as were also those 
who supported General Wentworth's 
claim that the fleet did not give its full 
support to his requests by preventing 
communication with the town from 
the shore to the eastward. Admiral 
Vernon, when requested to do so by 
General Wentworth, appears to have 
kept, so far as possible, the stretch 
of shore to the eastward under the 
guns of some of his ships, but it could 
not have been an easy matter with the 
sailing craft of that day to remain off 
a lee shore at times of high wind and 
with a strong westerly current, ready 
night and day to fire upon a small strip 
of sand overgrown with mangroves. 

In his criticism of the land opera- 
tions under General Wentworth, Ad- 
miral Vernon, somewhat overbearing 
by nature, appears to have been, to 
some extent unjust, and that he 
clearly under-estimated the strength 
of San Lazaro is evident from letters 
which he wrote at the time. It ap- 
pears doubtful whether, in attacking 
San Lazaro, its weakest and most 
approachable side was accurately de- 
termined in advance, but whether this 



Admiral B^rnntt 




PART OF THE CARTAGENA WALLS WITH SAN LAZARO IN DISTANCE 



was so or not, General Wentworth de- 
cided that, without effecting a breach, 
an attack would be impracticable, and 
much time was consumed in attempt- 
ing to raise a battery for the pur- 
pose, as well as in correspondence 
with Admiral Vernon, already re- 
ferred to, respecting the use of the 
vessels of the fleet for effecting the 
breach. During this time the bulk of 
the American colonial troops had been 
left in the ships, their usefulness be- 
ing doubted, more particularly on 
account of a large proportion of them 
being believed to be Papists ; by direc- 
tion of General Wentworth, these 
were landed on April 6, and after- 
wards are credited by the land offi- 
cers as having rendered gallant ser- 
vices. 

On April 9, pressed by the re- 
proaches of Admiral Vernon for 
the long delays, and threatened day 
by day with a lessening power of 



attack due to the rapidly increasing 
sickness among his troops, General 
Wentworth, with the consent of a 
council of war of the land officers, at- 
tempted to carry San Lazaro by 
storm. The attack was intended to 
be by night, but owing either to the 
trickery of native guides or to badly 
formed plans on the part of General 
Wentworth, the attack was begun 
upon the almost precipitous southern 
side of the fortress, with scaling lad- 
ders of insufficient length. This un- 
fortunate error served to warn the 
Spanish troops, and the real attack 
hardly began before the broiling hot 
tropical sun shone relentlessly upon 
the attacking forces. With a bravery 
deserving better guidance, the troops 
stood their ground, enduring for 
hours the terrible fire from above their 
heads and the burning rays of the 
sun, but the ramparts were not car- 



Admiral H^rnnn 



ried,and finally the troops were forced 
to retire leaving, it is said, half their 
number either dead or wounded at 
the foot of the walls of the fortress. 
At a council of war of the naval com- 
manders, Vernon, Ogle, and Le- 
stock, on April 12, it was recom- 
mended that in view of the land forces 
having been unable to erect a battery 
for effecting a breach in the walls of 
San Lazaro, and their having failed 
to storm it otherwise, and also in view 
of the great sickness prevailing, that 
"it will be for the King's service to 
"desist from the enterprise as imprac- 
ticable." At a council of war of the 
land officers on April 13, the blame 
for the failure to carry San Lazaro 
was attributed to the failure of the 
fleet to adequately co-operate, but the 
failure of the undertaking was ad- 
mitted and definite plans for the em- 
barkation of the troops were sug- 
gested. On the fifteenth, the stores 
were taken on board the ships, and on 
the day following the troops, sadly re- 
duced in numbers, and many very ill, 
were re-embarked. So great were the 
losses to the troops through disease 
and battle that not over one-third of 
the land troops appear to have re- 
turned with the fleet to Jamaica. 



For about a fortnight after the 
troops were re-embarked, the admiral 
kept the fighting vessels employed in 
destroying the forts and batteries, the 
structural strength of some of which, 
particularly of Castillo Grande, ap- 
pears to have been so great as to have 
made the work both difficult and tedi- 
ous. Also during the interval before 
sailing, an arrangement was made by 
means of courteous letters exchanged - 
under flags of truce between the ad- 
miral and the viceroy for an exchange 
of prisoners. On April 24, at a Gen- 
eral Council of War, it was deter- 
mined to sail for Jamaica as soon as 
possible, and by May 8, 1741, the 
great fleet had left Cartagena, having, 
it is true, rendered useless the de- 
fenses of the harbor and destroyed six 
heavy ships and some minor craft, but 
having failed to enter the city or to 
obtain any substantial booty. 

The earlier successes of Vernon 
made the news of his failure all the 
more distressing to the English peo- 
ple, and the expedition and the causes 
leading to its failure played a not 
unimportant part in English politics 
for some time. 



■ 



HARBOR AND BAY 



or 



CARTAGENA 



IN 1741 



om confenmoErarjr map? and, 
rds corrected!^ recent surveys. 






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CD 

HI" 

placer 



Geographical Mi/es 



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'rt.Msn'zani/Ii 



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I 3 U 'k 'U o 



2 



Admiral Tfernnn 



APPENDIX 



i 
Declaration of War in 1739 

Trusty and well Beloved — We greet you Well— 

Whereas several unjust seizures have been made and depredations carried on in the 
West Indies by Spanish Guarda Costas and Ships acting under the Commission of the 
King of Spain or his Governors contrary to the Treatys subsisting between us and the 
Crown of Spain and to the Law of Nations to the Great prejudice of the lawfull Trade 
& Commerce of our subjects; and many crueltys and barbaritys have been exercised 
on the Persons of such our subjects whose vessels have been so seized by the said Span- 
ish Guarda Costas ; And whereas frequent complaint has been made to the Court of Spain 
of these unjust practices and no satisfaction or Redress been procured; and whereas a 
Convention for makeing reparation to our subjects for the losses sustained by them on 
account of the unjust seizure & Captures above-mentioned was concluded between Us and 
the King of Spain on the 14th day of January last, N. S., by which convention it was 
stipulated that a certain sum of money should be paid at London within a Term specified 
in the sd. Convention as a ballance due on the part of Spain to the Crown and subjects 
of Great Britain which Term did expire on the 25th day of May last and the paymt of 
the said sum agreed by the sd. Convention has not been made according to the Stipulation 
for that purpose, by which means the Convention above-mentioned has been manifestly 
violated & Broke by the King of Spain and our Subjects remain without any Satisfaction 
or reparation for the many Great & Grievous losses sustained by them : We have tho't 
fit for ye vindicating the Honour of Our Crown & for procuring Reparation and Satis- 
faction for our Injured subjects to order Reprisals to be made upon the Crown & sub- 
jects of Spain. And We do therefore by virtue of these presents authorize & impower you 
to issue forth and grant Commissions of Marque & Reprisals to any of our loveing sub- 
jects or others who shall apply to you for the same and whom you shall deem fitly quali- 
fied in that behalf, For Armeing and fiting out Private Ships of War for the apprehend- 
ing, seizing and taking the Ships, vessels & goods belonging to the King of Spain, his 
vassals & subjects or any inhabiting within his Countrys Territories & Dominions in the 
West Indies. 

Provided always that before any such Commission or Commissions be Issued forth, 
security be given upon such Commission as hath been used in such cases. And you shall 
insert in every Commission to be so granted by you all such clauses and give such Direc- 
tions & Instructions to the Person or Persons to whom you shall grant such Commissions 
as have been usual in cases of the like nature. And for so doing this shall be your war- 
rant. And so we bid you farewell. 

Given at our Court at Kensington the fifteenth day of June 1739, in the thirteenth 
year of our Reign. 

By his Majesty's Command, 

PIollis Newcastle. 

Superscribed "To our Trusty & Well Beloved Jonathan (Belcher) Esq., our Capt. 
General & Govt in chief of our Provinces of the Massa. Bay and New Hampshire in 
America & in his Absence to our Commander in Chief or to the President of Council 
of our said Province for the time being. 



Admiral B^rnntt 



ii 

Transcript from Original Articles of Capitulation granted by Edward Vernon, Esq., 
Vice-Admiral of the Blue and Commander-in-Chief of His Majesty's Ships and Vessels 
in the West Indies, and Commodore Brown; to Don Francisco Martinez de Retey, Gov- 
ernor of Porto Bello, and Don Francisio de Albaroa, Commandant of the Guarda Costas 
at the same place, the 22nd November, 1739, O. S. 



"1st Article. That the garrison be allowed to march out, as desired, upon condition 
the King of Great Britain's troops be put into possession of Gloria Castle, before four 
of the clock this evening, and the garrison to march out by ten of the clock to-morrow 
morning. 

"That the inhabitants may either remove or remain, under the promise of security 
for themselves and their effects. 

"2nd. That the Spanish soldiers may have a guard, if they think it necessary. 

"3rd. They may carry off two cannons mounted with ten charges of powder for 
each, and their match lighted. 

"4th. The gates of the Gloria Castle must absolutely be in possession of the King 
our master's troops by four of the clock, and the Spanish garrison shall remain in all 
safety for their persons or effects till the appointed time of their marching out, and to 
carry with them provisions and ammunition necessary for their safety. 

"5th. That the ships with their apparel and arms, be absolutely delivered up to the 
use of his Brittanic Majesty; but that all the officers, both soldiers and crew, shall have 
three days allowed them to retire with all their personal effects ; only one officer being 
admitted on board such ship and vessel, to take possession for the King our master, and 
see this article strictly complied with. 

"6th. That provided the Articles above mentioned are strictly complied with, and 
that possession be given of Castle St. Jeronimo in the same manner as is stipulated for 
the Castle Gloria, then the Clergy, the Churches and Town shall be protected and pre- 
served in all their immunities and properties, and that all prisoners already taken 
shall be set at liberty before our leaving the port. 

"Given under our hands on board his Majesty's ship "Burford" in Porto Bello har- 
bour, the 22nd day of November, 1739, O. S. 

"E. Vernon, 
"Chas. Brown." 



Ill 

Transcript from Original Articles of Capitulation granted by Edward Vernon, Esq., 
Vice-Admiral of the Blue, and Commander-in-Chief of his Brittanic Majesty's Ships and 
Vessels in the West Indies, to Don Juan Carlos Gutures de Zavollos. Captain of Fool and 
Castellano of the Castle of St. Lorenzo, at the mouth of the River Chagre. 

"1st. That upon his Brittanic Majesty's troops being put into immediate possession 
of the Fort St. Lorenzo, at the mouth of the river Chagre, the said Castellano and all his 
garrison be at free liberty to march out without any molestation, and may retire into the 
village of Chagre, or where else they please. 

"2nd. That the inhabitants of Chagre may remain in safety in their own houses, 
under a promise of security to their persons and houses. 

"3rd. That the Guarda Costa sloops be delivered up to the use of his Brittanic 
Majesty in the condition they are, and the King of Spain's Custom house. 

"4th. That the Clergy and Churches in the town of Chagre shall be protected and 
preserved in all their immunities. 

"Given under my hand, on board his Brittanic Majesty's ship, the 'Strafford, 1 al 
anchor before the river Chagre, this 24th of March, 1740. 

"E. Vernon." 



Afcmiral l^rnott 



IV 

Sailing and Fighting Instructions to British Fleet on Sailing from Jamaica 

Issued by Edward Vernon, Vice=Admiral of the Blue, and 

Commander=in=Chief of all His Majesty's Ships 

and Vessels in the West Indies 

LINE OF BATTLE 

The "Princess Amelia" to lead with the Starboard, and the "Suffolk" with 
the Larboard Tacks on Board. But if I shall find it necessary from the differ- 
ent Motions of the Enemy, to change our Order of Battle, to have those who 
are now appointed to lead on the Starboard Tack, to continue to lead the fleet 
on the Larboard Tack on our going about, or those now to lead on the Lar- 
board Tack, on the contrary to do the same, as the Exigency of the Service 
may require ; I will, with my Signal for Tacking, hoist a Dutch Jack on the 
Flag Staff, under the Union Flag, the usual Signal for Tacking, when they are 
to continue to lead the Fleets on their respective Tacks accordingly. 



REAR-ADMIRAL OF THE BLUE, SIR CHALONER OGLE 



FRIGATES. 


RATES. 


SHIPS NAMES. 


CAPTAINS. 


MEN. 


GUN! 




3d, 


Princess Amelia, 


Hemington, 


600, 


80. 


Experiment, 
Sheerness. 


4th, 
3d, 


Windsor, 

York, 

Norfolk, 


Berkley, 

Coates, 

Graves, 


400, 
4OO, 
GOO, 


60. 
60. 
80. 


Vesuvius Fireship, 
Terrible Bomb, 




Russell, 


Sir C. Ogle, ) 
Capt. Norris, f 


615, 


80. 


Phseton, 




Shrewsbury, 


Townsend, 


GOO, 


SO. 


Goodley, 


4th, 


Rippon, 

Litchfield, 


Jolley, 
Cleveland, 


400, 
300, 


60. 
50. 






Jersey, 
Tilbury, 


Lawrence, 
Long, 


400, 

4OO, 


60. 
60. 



VICE-ADMIRAL OF THE BLUE, VERNON 



FRIGATES. 


RATES. 


ships' names. 


CAPTAINS. 


MEN. 


GUN! 


Squirrel, 


3d, 


Orford, 


Ld.Aug. Fitzroy, 


480, 


70. 


Shoreham, 


4th, 


Princess Louisa, 


Stapleton, 


400, 


60. 


Eleanor, 




Augusta, 


Denuison, 


400, 


60. 


Seahorse, 




Worcester, 


Perry Mayne, 


400, 


60. 


Strombolo, 


3d, 


Chichester, 


Robert Trevor, 


too, 


80. 


Success, 




Princess Caroline, 


Adm. Vernon, ) 
Capt. Watson, j 


620. 


SO. 


Vulcan, 




Torbay, 


Gascoigne, 


600, 


SO. 


Cumberland, 


4th, 


Strafford, 


Tho. Trevor, 


400, 


60. 


Alderney Bomb, 




Weymouth, 


Knowles, 


400, 


60. 


Pompey, 




Deptford, 


Moyston, 


400, 


60. 


Brig. Tender, 


3d. 


Burford, 


Griffen, 


480, 


70. 



Ahmtral Uernon 

COMMODORE LESTOCK'S DIVISION 



FRIGATES. 


RATES. 


SHIPS NAMES. 


CAPTAINS. 


MEN. 


GUN. 




4th, 


Defiance, 


John Trevor, 


-lOO, 


60. 






Dunkirk, 


Cooper, 


4OO, 


do. 


Astrea, 




Lyon, 


Cotterel, 


4OO, 


60. 


Wolf Sloop, 


3d, 


Prince Frederic, 


Ld. A.Beauclerc, 


480, 


70. 


^Etna, 




Boyne, 


Com. Lestock, ) 
Capt. Colby, [ 


60O, 


80. 


Firebrand, 




Hampton Court, 


Dent, 


480, 


70. 


Virgin Queen, 


4th, 


Falmouth, 


Douglass, 


300, 


SO. 






Montague, 


Chambers, 


300, 


60. 




3d. 


Suffolk, 


Davers, 


480, 


70. 



SIGNALS 

When the Admiral would speak with the Captain of any Ship undermen- 
tioned, he will raise a pendant, as against the Ship's name, and of the Colour 
set above it ; if a Lieutenant, the Same Signal with a Weft of the Ensign ; and 
if a Boat without an Officer, the Weft will be hoisted but half Staff up. Mem- 
orandum, when I would have any of the Fireships, Bombs or Tenders, taken 
in tow at the same Time I make the Signal for the Ship that is to tow, and for 
the Ship that is to be tow'd, I will hoist up a Flag Blue and White, at the 
Flag-staff of the Main-top-mast-head. 



RED. 


WHITE. 


BLUE. 


YELLOW. 




Boyne. 
Norfolk. 


Pss. Amelia. 
Suffolk. 


Chichester. 

Shrewsbury. 


Terrible. 
Eleanor. 


* Iain j Top-mast. 

l ore j Head. 
Mizen ( 


Worcester. 


Lyon. 


Defiance. 


^Etna. 


Tilbury. 


Squirrel. 


Torbay. 


Firebrand. 


Starbd \ Main-topsail. 


Windsor. 


Pss. Louisa 


Falmouth. 


Vesuvius. 


Larbd / Yard-arm. 


Burford. 


P. Frederic. 


Strafford. 


Phaeton. 


Starbd \ Fore-topsail. 


Montague. 


Orford. 


Weymouth. 


Strombolo. 


Larbd j Yard arm. 


Shoreham. 


Augusta. 


Pss. Caroline. 


Success. 


Starbd ( Mizen-topsai 


HamptonCourt 


Dunkirk. 


Jersey. 


Vulcan. 


Larbd"/ Yard-arm. 


Litchfield. 


Lud. Castle. 


Deptford. 


Cumberland. 


Starbd ( Main-yard- 
Larbd ) arm. 


Experiment. 


Rippon. 


York. 


Alderney. 


Sea Horse. 


Sheerness. 


Russell. 


Brig. Tender. 


Starbd \ Fore-Yard- 


Astrea. 


Wolf. 




Virgin Queen. 

Pompey. 

Goodley. 


Larbd / arm. 
Starbd \ Cross-jack- 
Larbd { yard-arm. 



When the Ships are in Line of Battle, the Frigates, Fireships, Bombs and 
Tenders are to keep on the opposite Side of the Enemy, when I make the Signal 
in Line of Battle, for the Van of the kleet to lack lirsi in order to gain the 
Windward of the Enemy, then each Ship is to tack in the Headmost Ships 
wake, for losing no Ground. For all other Signals they arc refer'd to the 
General printed Sailing and Fighting Instructions, and such other additional 
instructions as you received from me. 



Admiral l^rttntt 



V 

Resolution of a Council of War to Settle Distribution of Booty — Held 
on Board " Princess Carolina," March 5, 1741 

Whereas, it appears by my Lords Justices additional Instructions of the 22nd of July, 
1740, to be his Majesty's Royal Pleasure, that for preserving that Harmony and good 
Understanding between his Majesty's Sea and Land Forces, which is so necessary for 
the carrying on his Majesty's Service with Success, that it should be settled by a Council 
of War, to consist of Sea and Land Officers, in what Manner and Proportion, Booty 
taken from the Enemy at Land, during the recent Expedition, shall be distributed between 
his Majesty's Sea and Land Forces, in all Cases where the said Sea and Land Forces shall 
be jointly engaged, in the attacking and taking of any Place, Fort, or Settlement, from 
the Enemy. 

And a Paper accompanying the said Instructions, and said to have been prepared in 
Conformity to the two preceding Settlements in 1694 and 1702, being laid before your 
Council of War. 

Your Council of War, to shew their entire Disposition to conform to our Royal Mas- 
ter's Inclinations, by studying to preserve that Harmony recommended to us, have taken the 
said Paper into Consideration, and to avoid the Risk of disagreeing Opinions in prepar- 
ing a new one, resolve to make that the Plan of their present Regulation. 

And your Commanding Officers in Chief by Sea and Land, desirous to preserve that 
good Harmony recommended to us by his Majesty, and pleased with an Occasion of 
contributing to it, by giving up, of their own Motive and free Will, for procuring so desir- 
able an End, a fifth part of what was by the said Distribution, allotted to them, in order 
to divide the whole into Sixteenths, and to have the said Sixteenths distributed, where 
the Council of War should think them most wanted. 

Your said Council of War accordingly proceeded to the Consideration of it, and do 
agree that the whole amount of such Booty shall be divided into sixteen equal Parts, or 
Portions. 

Whereof four Sixteenths shall be given to the Commanders in Chief of the Sea and 
Land Forces, to be equally divided between them. 

To the other Admiral, General Officers, and Commodore, to be equally divided 
amongst them, in proportion to their respective Salaries, two Sixteenths. 

To the several Colonels, Captains of Ships of the Line of Battle, Lieutenant Colo- 
nels, Captains of Ships of War giving Rank, Quarter-Master General, Adjutant General, 
Commissary General, Paymaster General of the Land Forces, Judge Advocate, Secreta- 
ries to the Admiral and General, Provost Marshal, Surgeons and Chaplains General by 
Sea and Land, Majors of Regiments and of Brigades, Masters and Commanders of Fire- 
ships, Bomb-ketches, Sloops and other Ships of War not giving Rank, Aid du Camps 
upon the Establishment, Captains at Land, Lieutenants at Sea, Masters of Ships giving 
Rank, Lieutenants at Land, Gunners, Pursers, Boatswains, Carpenters, Ensigns, Adju- 
tants, Quarter-Masters of Regiments, Chaplains and Surgeons of Ships and Regiments, 
Masters, Mates, Directors of the Hospital, and their Surgeons four Sixteenths, to be 
divided amongst them in proportion to their respective Salaries. 

To the Non-Commission and Warrant Officers at Sea and Land, such as Midshipmen, 
Carpenters Mates, Boatswains Mates, Gunners Mates, Masters at Arms, Sergeants. Bom- 
bardiers, Gunners of the Train, Yeomen of the Sheets, Cockswains, Quarter-Masters, 
Quarter-Masters Mates, Surgeons Mates, Yeomen of the Powder-Room, and Corporals, 
two Sixteenths, to be divided equally amongst them. 

To the Cooks of Ships, and all others enumerated with them, in the Proclamation 
for the Distribution of Prizes at Sea, Seamen and Soldiers, Drummers, Marshals Men. 
Pioneers, or Persons working to clear Grounds, and assist at Sieges, four Sixteenths, to 
be equally divided amongst them. 

But no Officer to be allowed to share in two Capacities ; and whenever any Person 
shall hold two different Employments, he shall chuse in which of them he will take his 
Dividend. But it is not hereby intended, to exclude Colonels, Lieutenant Colonels, and 
Majors, from receiving their shares as Captains, as well as Field Officers; and Sea Cap- 
tains Pay to be accounted upon King William's Establishment. 

And that every Officer under the Rank of a Commission, or Warrant Officer, Sea- 
man, or Soldier, that shall happen to be wounded in any siege, or Action, whose Booty 
shall be taken, shall have a double share in Proportion to his Rank, in Consideration of 
his Wounds. 

Given under our Hands, on Board his Majesty's Ship the "Princess Carolina," at 
Anchor off Carthagena, the 5th day of March, 1740. 

E. Vernon, J. Guise, E. Wolfe, 

Thomas Wentworth, Richard Lestock. J. Hemington. 

C. Ogle, Wm. Blakeney, 



Admiral H^rtton 



VI 

Instructions from Vice=Admiral Vernon to Sir Chaloner Ogle, Issued on 

Board the «« Princess Carolina" at Anchor off Cartagena, 

the 6th of March, 1741 

Whereas it has been determin'd in a Council of War, vigorously to attack Cartagena 
both by Sea and Land; a Resolution which the Inclemency of the Country manifests the 
Prudence of, as our Forces are decreasing daily by Sickness, so that slow Measures are 
certain Ruin. 

And as the first Point Judg'd material to secure the Success of the Enterprize, is to 
render ourselves Masters of Boca Chica Castle, and all the Fortresses and Batteries 
erected for defending the Entrance of the Harbour, for the more closely blocking up the 
Town, and cutting it off from all Communication by Sea, either within or without the 
Harbour, and above all for securing our Transports a safe Harbour to ride in, who will 
lay too much exposed without. 

And as the most probable, as well as most proper Place to secure a Descent in, is in 
the Little Bay, under the Command of the two Forts St. Philip and St. Jago, where, I 
am inform'd ships can come safely to an Anchor in good Ground, and within less than 
Musket-shot of the Shore, and may lay to batter and command those two Forts, without 
having Occasion to open the Castle of Boca Chica, in which Case I apprehend the Fire of 
Three Eighty Gun Ships, if there be room for them to anchor there a-head of each other, 
will be amply sufficient for demolishing the said Fort, commanding all the said Bay, and 
securing there a safe landing of the Troops, under the Fire of their Guns; the Point, I 
apprehend, of the utmost Importance, for securing the Success of this Expedition, it being, 
as I apprehend, the very Spot on which M. Pontis made his Descent, when he took Car- 
thagena, and began with taking Boca Chica, and as to the northward of the said two 
Forts on Terra Bomba the Enemy are said lately to have erected a considerable Fascine 
Battery of eighteen Pounders, which there is said to be deep water enough to approach 
within Musket-shot of, but that the anchoring Ground so near in, is foul and stony, and 
would cut the Cables, and to anchor in clean Ground would hardly be within point blank 
Cannon Shot ; you must in employing the rest of your Ships in silencing that Battery, and 
one of little consequence to the Northward of that called Chamba, govern yourself in it 
as you shall judge most prudent, either by anchoring them, if you can find clean Ground 
near enough, or by ranging close to them one after another, and then standing off, and 
plying to Windward, to renew the Fire in the same manner of them, for clearing all that 
Coast from the Enemies, as it is said there is likewise a good little Bay for a Descent 
under Chamba Battery, and it might divide the Enemy's Force the better, to make a 
Descent at both places at once, and expose their Troops the more to the Fire of our 
Ships. 

Having thus informed and instructed you according to the best Intelligence I have 
received, and furnished you with Pilots of the best Ability and Experience I could pro- 
cure, I rely on your Judgment and Resolution for the due Execution of my Orders. 

And you are hereby required and directed to proceed with your whole Division of 
Ships of the Line of Battle, for demolishing the said Forts and Batteries, and securing 
all the Country between them, so as to secure a Descent for the Forces, in the most 
convenient Parts for it, between the said Fort of St. Philip's and Chamba Battery. 

And the better to secure the Success of your enterprize, you are to give ciders in 
Writing to every respective Captain of your Division, not to suffer any [mprudent and 
hasty firing from their Ships, which only serves to embolden an Enemy, instead of dis 
couraging them; but to give strict orders not to suffer any gun to be fired from any of 
its Decks, till the respective Officers appointed to command on each respective Batt< i 
has seen to the pointing each Gun he is appointed to have the inspection over, and directed 



Afttturai $£rtt0tt 



the firing of it, that all possible Care may be used, to secure the Success of this first 
Attempt, on which the Success of the Whole so much depends ; and they are to endeavor 
to persuade and convince their Men, of the Folly and Imprudence of hasty firing, which 
serves only to encourage the Enemies, and expose themselves : And you are likewise, in 
your Orders in Writing, to assign to each particular Captain the Post he is to take, and 
the Orders he is to execute, that no one may have the least Pretence to plead Ignorance 
of your orders, which you are to enjoin the due Execution of, at the utmost Peril. 

And you are to order your respective Captains, to acquaint their respective Ships 
Companies, that the Whole of all Booty to be made upon the Enemies at Land, is gra- 
ciously granted by his Majesty, to be distributed among his Sea and Land Forces, as shall 
be agreed on by a Council of War of Sea and Land Officers, which have accordingly met 
and regulated the Distribution thereof, and have allotted a double Share to any Non- 
Commission or Warrant Officer, and private Man, that may happen to be wounded in the 
Service; and to assure of a further Reward from me, out of my Share, all who shall 
eminently distinguish themselves by any extraordinary actions of Prudence and Reso- 
lution, besides a secured Advancement proportionable to their Zeal and Resolution, 
exerted on so signal an Occasion, for the Honour of the Crown and future Prosperity 
of our Country. 

And you will have a Report from Captain Knowles, and the other Captains appointed 
for Viewing, Sounding, and making all necessary Observations, for your further Infor- 
mation and facilitating the Success of the said Attack. 

And you may remove your Flag on board any Ship of your Division, as you may 
judge most expedient for your more carefully directing and inspecting the due Execution 
of the whole Attack, which you are carefully and diligently to see to the due Execution 
of, and give all such additional Orders in, as you shall find to be necessary, from the 
Motions and Dispositions of the Enemy, and other Events that may arise in the' vigor- 
ous Execution of these Orders : For all and every part of which, this shall be your suffi- 
cient Warrant. Given under my Hand on board his Majesty's Ship "Princess Carolina," 
at Anchor off of Carthagena, this 6th of March, 1740. 

E. Vernon. 

To Sir Chaloner Ogle, Rear Admiral of the Blue Squadron of his Majesty's Fleet. 
By Command of the Admiral. Wm. Pearse. 



Abmtral Hernutt 



VII 

Resolution of a Council of War Held on Board the "Weymouth," 

March 21, 1741 

The Council of War taking into serious Consideration the slow Progress made by 
the Army since their landing, who have had everything landed for them since Monday 
last, and all done entirely by the Seamen; to leave them more at Liberty for' raising 
their Battery and cutting off the Enemy's Communication by Land, which, to us, is a 
great Surprize why it has not yet been done, in regard to the great Advantages given the 
Enemy by it. 

And as we cannot but entertain uneasy Apprehensions from such slow Proceedings, 
and being determin'd to do all in our Power to prevent them, have taken into serious 
Consideration what could possibly be done by Sea, more than has been done already, for 
securing the first Attempt, to be Masters of the Entrance into the Harbour. 

And though our being on a Lee-Shore and liable to great Hazards, for getting our 
Ships back, which shall be Considerably damaged in their Masts and Rigging, are such 
forcible Arguments, that we must in some sort act against our Judgments, as Seamen, in 
exposing his Majesty's Ships to Battering of Castles with them; yet as the Danger of 
a Disappointment might be more fatal to our Royal Master's Honour and Interest, we 
have chosen even to act against our Judgments, as Seamen, for securing the Success of 
the present attempt, that appears to us so very doubtful without it. 

And having called before us Captain Knowles, Capt. Rentone, and Lieut. Forrest, 
on whose Judgments we thought we could best depend, and had all the Information we 
could likewise gather from the Spanish Pilots (Prisoners with us) of what could possi- 
bly be attempted by Shipping. 

Your Council of War have, as the Necessity of the Case seemed to press it upon 
them, come to unanimous Resolution, to do the most that we can judge to be practicable. 
to secure the Success of this first Attempt, on which the Whole depends. 

Which we think may be to attempt to anchor four Ships as close to the Shore as 
possible, between the Castle of St. Jago (we are in Possession of) and the Castle of 
Boca Chica. 

Which four Ships shall be the "Boyne," "Suffolk," "Prince Frederick," and "Hampton- 
Court," of Commodore Lestock's Division, to be under his particular Orders and Direc- 
tions, for the posting them accordingly, and carrying on the Attack at Boca Chica Castle. 

And that the "Princess Amelia'' and the "Norfolk" shall take Post after them, so 
as to lye most commodious to batter the Castle of St. Joseph, and endeavor to destroy 
that, and direct their fire from raking Mr. Lestock's Ships, which we apprehend they 
would be otherwise liable to; and these two Ships to follow Sir Chaloner Ogle's Orders, 
of whose Division they are, for the Execution of the said Service. 

And as Sir Chaloner Ogle lies innermost, with his Division, that he shall order such 
other Ships of his Division in, to support the others, and employ any Fire he may observe 
to gall them, that cannot be come at by the Ships first anchor'd. which, must he left to 
his Prudence to direct, as shall appear to be necessary on the Enemy's Motions, when we 
come to Execution. 

And as we hope the Battery from the Shore will be got ready to play this nighl 
at farthest, that all necessary Orders shall he immediately issued in it. to the Ships who 
are to prepare for Service, to get themselves in Condition on the first Notice; and that 
if our Battery begins playing To-morrow, our Ships shall nunc to the said Attack, upon 
the first of the Sea-Breeze on Monday morning. 

To all which Resolutions we have unanimously agreed, and resolved to have put in 
Execution accordingly. 

Given under our Hands on Board the "Weymouth," this 2is1 of March. 1710, 

E. Vernon, 
C. 1 '..1 1 
Ricnn. Lestoi k. 



Abmtral Hrrntftt 



VIII 



Council of War Held on Board the •« Princess Carolina " in Carthagena 

Harbour, March 30, 1741 

Your Majesty's Forces being in full Possession of all the Castles, Forts, and Bat- 
teries, for defending the entrance into the Harbour of Carthagena, your Council of War 
took into Consideration what would be next advisable for them to proceed in. 

And as the Communication by Sea to Carthagena, by the Men of War being advanc d 
so near as within Gun-Shot of Castillo Grande, is now effectually cut off, it was adjudged 
proper that all possible Expedition should be used in embarking the Forces and Artillery, 
and that the Transports, as fast as they are embarked, should be moving off to the next 
general Rendezvous off the Bocandina, between the Shore and the "Burford, in order 
to make a Descent on the most convenient Place for their landing, to cut off the Com- 
munication of the Town of the Land Side, by running a Line from the Lake at the 
Back of the Popa, to the Bay, which is said to be about a quarter of a Mile ; and that the 
Artillery should be embarked with all possible Expedition, to proceed after them to the 
general Rendezvous; and that all possible means should be put in Use for procuring the 
best Intelligence in the Meantime, how to put this Resolution in Execution with the best 
Success 

And as General Wentworth represented they should want a greater Number of Men 
to be landed with them, in order effectually to invest the Town, it was resolved he should 
be supplied from the Men of War, with all such of the American forces, as he should 
judVe proper to be trusted on Shore; and likewise of the Detachments that were on 
Boar-d of Lord James Canendish's and Col, Bland's, whenever the rest of the Forces 
were landed and General Wentworth should represent it to be necessary. 

And your Council of War referred to the Transports being got up to the next general 
Rendezvous and taking such further resolutions as shall be judg'd most adviseable to 
secure the Success of this Expedition in taking the Town of Carthagena, which it has 
pleas'd God so wonderfully to favour the Success of his Majesty's Forces in hitherto. ^ 

Given under our Hands, on Board his Majesty's Ship the "Princess Carolina, in 
Carthagena Harbour, the 30th day of March, 1741. 

E. Vernon, 
Tho. Wentworth, 
C. Ogle, 
J. Guise, 
Richd. Lestock, 
Wm. Blakeney, 
E. Wolfe, 
J. Hemington. 



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